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Protected areas are one of the most effective tools for nature conservation. 
Consequently, almost all countries have agreed to set increasingly demanding goals for 
the expansion of their protected area systems. However, there is a large disparity among 
countries, and research on the cultural drivers of differences remains quite unexplored. 
Here, we explore the relationship between the protected extent and a limited spectrum 
of socio-economic characteristics, making focus on size and power features. Protected 
areas under strict conservation categories (I to IV, IUCN) were considered for 195 
countries, and relationships were modeled by means of LOESS regressions, violin plots, 
and a random forest ensemble learning method. Larger and more powerful countries (in 









relatively smaller units than smaller and less powerful countries. Out of the twenty most 
extensive countries of the world, only two exceed 10% of protection. This situation is 
problematic since an effective growth of the global protected area network depends on 
the willingness of larger and more powerful countries. We propose different hypotheses 
a posteriori that explain the role of size and power driving protection. These hypotheses 
involve direct mechanisms (e.g., the persuasive capacity of large countries) or 
mechanisms that mediate the interactions of some others (e.g., tourism contribution to 
GDP and insularity). Independently of mechanisms, our results emphasize the 
conservation responsibilities of large and powerful countries and contribute envisioning 
conservation scenarios in the face of changes in the number and size of countries. 
 




The physical, biological and cultural assets of the planet are unequally divided 
among more than 200 sovereign countries and dependencies of different legal character. 
The six largest countries of the world occupy 45% of the land area excluding 
Antarctica, while the smallest hundred occupy only 2.5% (Gini index, G = 0.80, Table 
1; data sources are depicted in Table 2). Moreover, ten countries exceeding 100 M 
inhabitants, encompass 60% of the world population, while there are 115 countries with 
less than 1 M (G = 0.81). This conjunction of conditions clearly implies differential 
access and appropriation of natural resources by humans, which is reflected and 
magnified in the gross domestic product (G = 0.87) and in the military expenditure (G = 
0.90). Perhaps less obvious is that these inequalities together imply different degrees of 
responsibility on the part of the administrations of countries in the long-term 
conservation of natural and cultural assets. This makes global sustainability hard to 
achieve considering that it should be a joint effort which exceeds current and future 
political borders. 
The countries with the highest level of wealth were the first to formalize 









America installed the modern concept of protected area in 1872 (Watson, Dudley, 
Segan, & Hockings, 2014), numerous sovereign or colonial governments quickly 
established their own parks and reserves (McNeely, Harrison, & Dingwall, 1994; 
Szafer, 1973; Watson, et al., 2014). The 20th century brought relevant geopolitical 
changes, such as the independence of colonial territories and the split of former 
territories after both World-Wars. Since then, new countries actively promoted the 
creation of protected areas, and conservation was no longer exclusive to powerful 
countries (Fairbrother, 2012; Frank, Hironaka, & Schofer, 2000). As of July 2018, there 
are around 240,000 terrestrial protected areas, which occupy a land area of 20.2 M km2 
or 14.9% of the world land surface excluding Antarctica (UNEP-WCMC, IUCN, & 
NGS, 2018). Furthermore, almost all countries in 2010 negotiated that at least 17% of 
terrestrial areas needed to be included within protected networks by 2020 (first clause of 
the Aichi Biodiversity Target 11, SCBD, 2010). 
Protected areas arise from a complex interplay of motivations related to 
perceived societal benefits, like the early preservation of iconic landscape features, or 
the late widespread agreement on the importance of maintaining nature and biodiversity 
(Baldi, Texeira, Martin, Grau, & Jobbágy, 2017; Pressey, 1994; Watson, et al., 2014). 
However, these motivations act as underlying forces, being the process of conforming 
protected areas driven by direct human-related or cultural drivers (hereafter, cultural 
drivers). These drivers can be associated with the economic or political context of the 
country, its social organization, and prevailing moral rules (Baldi, et al., 2017). There is 
currently a broad consensus about the need to increase the extent under protection to 
preserve the structure and functioning of nature (Rodrigues, et al., 2004; Watson, et al., 
2014). That is why a joint analysis of these drivers would identify the conditions that 
may facilitate or boost the creation of protected areas, as well as the conservation debts 
maintained by countries that have favorable conditions, but for which conservation has 
played a minor role in political agendas. 
Research on cultural drivers has not yet been examined or discussed thoroughly, 
and literature on this topic is mostly based on qualitative analyses focused on a few 
features. For example, several narratives have evidenced the importance of individual 
actors (e.g., heads of state, naturalists and scientists) and political actions driving the 
deployment of protected areas (Castañeda Rincón, 2006; Leal, 2017; Ouyang, Ye, 








1998). Quantitative studies are scarcer. For example, Marinaro, Grau, and Aráoz (2012) 
showed that, in Argentina, the totalitarian administrations of the first half of the 20th 
century established protected areas of large size. Meanwhile, subsequent democratic 
administrations made focus on the diversification of the protected network, with the 
inclusion of many areas of small size only when significant economic surpluses were 
available. 
Studies about cultural drivers become even less at the global level (Table 3). In 
their seminal assessment, Frank et al. (2000) showed that the links of countries to world 
society (e.g., the signature of environmental treaties) were strong drivers of the extent of 
protected areas. Later, Upton et al. (2008) found few significant relationships between 
poverty indicators and the extent of the protected area. They suggested that inconclusive 
associations could be attributed to the joint effect of two factors. On the one hand, local 
society pressures and economic capacity of more affluent countries aimed at setting 
aside land for conservation. On the other hand, international agendas and foreign 
investment in less affluent countries contributed to land conservation. McDonald and 
Boucher (2011) found that more affluent countries achieved a larger extent of protection 
in the middle of the 20th century, while currently, less affluent/developing and more 
affluent/developed countries protect their territories at similar rates. Kashwan (2017) 
found that the protected extent depended mainly on the interaction between democratic 
strength and economic inequality. Protected areas tended to emerge under undemocratic 
settings with high inequality, or under democratic settings with low inequality. Finally, 
Baynham-Herd et al. (2018) assessed the engagement and investment in the 
environment and pro-environmental behavior and found that governance was the most 
relevant driver of protection, with a minor contribution of the level of globalization as 
well. 
From the above studies, only Frank, et al. (2000) and Baynham-Herd et al. 
(2018) marginally considered the size and power of countries in order to explain cross-
national differences in nature conservation. Frank et al. (2000) included population size 
in models and Baynham-Herd et al. (2018) included economy size (Table 3). At this 
point, we identify a gap in knowledge. In a broad sense, country size and power (e.g., 
land area, economic activity, and military power; Arvanitidis & Kollias, 2016; 
Crowards, 2002b) constitute determining factors in numerous economic, political and 








1998; Prasad, 2009; Spolaore, 2004). Given these circumstances, and returning to the 
initial question of the unbalanced distribution of assets in the world, this study aims to 
explore the relationships between the intertwined concepts of size and power and the 
extent of protected areas. Additionally, we explore the relationship between the land 
area of a country and the size of the largest protected unit. Along with the size and 
power metrics, other cultural drivers used in previous research (e.g., education) were 
included in analyses to contextualize the shape and strength of relationships. Notably, 
the smallest and less powerful countries in the world are commonly excluded from 
comparative analyses in different fields, which biases our current knowledge to a partial 
spectrum of environmental or cultural conditions, therefore excluding extreme and 
deviant cases (Baldacchino & Milne, 2006; Veenendaal & Corbett, 2014). This study 
intends to amend these geographic, methodological and –perhaps– ideological biases by 
encompassing data from a more comprehensive set of countries. 
2. Methods 
The data about the size of individual protected areas (in km2) and of the extent of 
protected areas at a national level (in percentage) were obtained from the World 
Database on Protected Areas, March 2018 (UNEP-WCMC and IUCN, 2018). We 
included only protected areas which have been specifically designated for nature 
protection, i.e., strict nature reserve, wilderness areas, national parks, natural 
monuments or features, and habitat/species management areas, categorized as I-IV 
under the IUCN guidelines (1994). In this database, protected areas in many countries 
(e.g., Bolivia, South Africa, Comoros) are almost exclusively labeled under the IUCN 
class "Not Reported", which could lead to an underestimation of their national figures. 
In this sense, for these countries, we considered previous UNEP-WCMC 
categorizations (e.g., Bolivia or South Africa in 2013 had many protected areas 
categorized as I to IV) or included areas labeled with the general designations described 
above (e.g., national parks) and small variations of them. For those polygons that shared 
land and sea, we only considered the terrestrial area by subtracting the marine area to 
the overall GIS area from tabular data (Figure A.1, Appendix A). We excluded all 
protected areas with a "proposed" status. Due to a potential overestimation of national 
protected extent from overlapping problems (Deguignet, et al., 2017), polygons were 
dissolved and new individual areas were recalculated using the Mollweide projection. 









50% of the units, e.g., Moldova), we included information from point data. After this 
data manipulation, the total global protected extent was 9.2 M km2, which is equivalent 
to 7.0% of the land surface, divided into approximately 114,000 units. 
We included as samples of this study 195 countries members of the United 
Nations, and the Cook Islands and Niue (both under the Realm of New Zealand and 
Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity –CBD). We excluded from the 
analyses the city states of Monaco and the Vatican City, the State of Palestine, and non-
sovereign territories (in where land management policies can be delineated outside their 
territories). 
We related the protected extent at a national level to sixteen independent 
variables representing cultural drivers (Table 2). The first six variables are associated 
with the intertwined concepts of size and power of a country. The first variable is 
Crowards (2002a, 2002b) classification based on non-hierarchical cluster analysis, 
generated from land area, gross domestic product (GDP) and population. The second, 
third and fourth variables are the individual land area, GDP and population. We added 
two more variables to the size and power group, i.e., the military expenditure and the 
possession of external territories (Arvanitidis & Kollias, 2016; Baldacchino & Milne, 
2006). The following ten variables are related to general geographical, conservation and 
socio-economic characteristics of countries, and are used to contextualize the strength of 
variables related to size and power. These ten variables are equal or similar to those 
used in the global studies of Table 3, except for the tourism contribution to GDP 
(variable #13) and whether the countries are continental or insular (variable #15). These 
last two variables are included as many local studies highlight the role of tourism as a 
driver of conservation (e.g., Maekawa, Lanjouw, Rutagarama, & Sharp, 2013), 
especially on islands (e.g., Sufrauj, 2011). Finally, the governance value (variable #12) 
of Somalia was excluded by considering it as an outlier. All data is available in 
Appendix B. 
With an exclusively exploratory and descriptive purpose, we regressed the 
protected extent (in percentage) to continuous variables by means of a Local Regression 
(LOESS) method. This non-parametric approach identifies patterns and fits a smoothed 
curve neither assuming any global function nor estimating a statistical significance of 









variables, we constructed violin plots, which are similar to box plots with a rotated 
kernel density plot on each side. In violin plot, the density traces graphically show the 
distributional characteristics of data, allowing quick and insightful comparisons 
between classes (e.g., to have or not an external possession), and avoiding the use of 
abstract symbols to depict main features, i.e., center, spread, asymmetry, and outliers 
(Hintze & Nelson, 1998). We also assessed the correlation between continuous 
variables through a Kendall’s τ non-parametric test (Whittaker, 1987). The number of 
samples that were used for LOESS models (i.e., countries) varied according to data 
available (from 145 to 195, see Figure 2). 
In order to measure the individual effect of the independent variables, we 
applied a random forest ensemble learning method (Breiman, 2001), which estimates 
their importance (variable importance, VI) by looking at how much the mean square 
error (MSE) increases when the out-of-bag data (OOB) for that variable is permuted 
while all others are left unchanged (Grömping, 2009; Liaw & Wiener, 2002). To 
include all considered countries in the random forest, we filled missing values with the 
continental averages (5.4% of the values from the combination of 195 countries * 16 
variables). As we included different types of variables (i.e., continuous vs. categorical), 
we followed Strobl, Boulesteix, Kneib, Augustin, and Zeileis (2008, 2009) 
methodological suggestions and calculated the VI using the "cforest" function of the 
"party" package (Hothorn, Hornik, & Zeileis, 2008). As some of these variables vary in 
their scale of measurement or their number of categories, we selected the subsample 
without replacement approach; and as some of these variables were highly correlated, 
we selected the conditional permutation approach. In the cforest procedure, we chose a 
number of trees to grow, ntree, equal to 2500; a minimum size of the terminal nodes, 
nodesize, equal to 1; and a number of input variables at each split, mtry, equal to 3. For 
mtry, the chosen value minimized the OOB-MSE of the model. As VI results differed 
from run to run, we calculated a mean and standard deviation of VI values by running 
the model 50 times. The VI values were used here with an explanatory and 
interpretative rather than predictive aim. Data processing was conducted in RStudio v. 










Land area is –perhaps– the most intuitive variable representing the size and 
power of a country. At a first cartographic glance, some of the largest countries of the 
world set aside a lower extent of their territories than some of the smallest ones for 
conservation (Figure 1). Russia and the United States of America, which are examples 
at the high end of the land area gradient, protect 6.6% and 9.4% of their territories, 
respectively. In contrast, Liechtenstein and São Tomé and Príncipe, which are examples 
at the low end of the land area gradient, protect 14.1% and 30.0% of their territories 
(Appendix B). Figure 2 shows the protected extent along the classes or gradients of 
independent variables representing cultural drivers for all countries. Following 
Crowards' classification (2002a, 2002b), we show a high dispersion in the protected 
extent values within classes, with some "micro" to "large" countries achieving the 
highest values (up to 40.8% in Bhutan), but only one out of the seven "very large" 
countries surpassing 10% (Figure 2a). Complementing the cartographic description of 
Figure 1 regarding the land area, data reveal an inverse U-shaped curve pronounced at 
the low end of the gradient and with a gentle slope at the high end (Figure 2b). Very 
small countries protect little (e.g., Nauru, San Marino), but with a small increase in land 
area, some countries set aside significant portions of their territories to conservation 
(e.g., Liechtenstein, Niue). The maximum values of protected extent are found in small 
countries that exceed the ~500 km2 (e.g., Luxembourg, Sri Lanka). Moving on along the 
land area gradient, the slope of the LOESS model becomes negative, as many countries 
have the potential to achieve high values (e.g., Tanzania, Chile), but many more have 
very low conservation values. Finally, the largest countries do not equate the values of 
the smallest: Out of the twenty most extensive countries, only two exceed a 10% 
protected (i.e., Indonesia and Mongolia). 
The relationship between the protected extent and other components of size and 
power also adopts an inverse U-shaped curve (i.e., population size) or negative linear 
shapes (i.e., military expenditure and gross domestic product –GDP) (Figure 2c-e). 
These consistent results would obey the strong and positive correlation that exists 
between the four continuous variables (Figure 3). More affluent countries protect less 
than less affluent ones: Out of the twenty countries with the largest GDP that account 
for more than 80.5% of global amounts, none achieve the 17% of protection suggested 








six does. Countries with higher military expenditure protect less than those with the 
lower ones: Out of the twenty countries with the largest military budget that accounts 
for more than 85% of global amounts, only Israel surpasses the 17% of protection. 
Conversely, out of the twenty countries with the smallest military expenditure, five 
surpass the 17% of protection. Albeit with a less clear pattern, those countries with 
external possessions set aside less land for conservation than those without these 
(Figure 2f). 
According to the random forest analysis, the most relevant variable determining 
the protected extent of a country is income inequality, being ~2.7 times more important 
than the following two variables, i.e., the military expenditure and the age of the 
protected area network (VI = 1.62 ± 0.15, 0.61 ± 0.09 and 0.55 ± 0.10, respectively; 
Figure 4). The strong importance of income inequality obtains suggests the interaction 
with other variables, given the unclear dependence of the protected extent to this 
variable according to the LOESS model (Figure 2h). In comparison, other variables 
related or unrelated to size and power, such as the above-mentioned land area (VI = 
0.04 ± 0.06), governance (VI = 0.14 ± 0.10) or even the contribution of tourism to GDP 
(VI = -0.25 ± 0.09) suggest clearer relationships to protected extent from LOESS 
models (Figure 2b,l,m). Although none of the studies of Table 3 incorporated the 
condition of continental/insular among the driving factors, it is interesting to notice the 
high protected extent achieved by some insular countries (tropical, temperate or cold; 
Figure 2o). Out of the ten countries with the highest level of protection, eight are 
insular, and out of the next ten countries, half are insular. 
In addition to an apparent effect of land area on the protected extent of a 
country, the smallest countries also preserve larger protected areas in relation to their 
particular size, with the Seychelles being at the top of the ranking (Figure 5). As other 
examples, we can mention the Ôbo Natural Park in the southernmost São Tomé island 
of São Tomé and Príncipe, which covers 24.4% of the 860 km² of the country (Figure 
1), while the Garsaelli Forest Reserve in Liechtenstein covers 6.7% of the national 
territory. Out of the first twenty countries whose most extensive protected area 
constitutes a larger fraction of the country, eight of them are "micro", seven are "small" 
and five are "medium" following Crowards' classification (2002a, 2002b). The first 
"large" country that appears in the ranking is Venezuela, in the thirteenth position, 









There is a broad consensus in society that protected areas are one of the most 
effective tools in the conservation of nature, and that it is necessary to extend their 
current surface and connect all biophysical systems (Rodrigues, et al., 2004; Saura, et 
al., 2018; Watson, et al., 2014). However, this globalized discourse contrasts with our 
results for the more developed or powerful countries, as it is argued in section 4.1. A 
key to forecast scenarios and eventually balance efforts across countries lies in the 
comprehension of the cultural drivers of conservation, as it is argued in section 4.2. 
4.1. Size and power 
The largest and most powerful countries (in terms of land area) maintain a 
conservation debt regarding protected extent in comparison with micro- to medium-size 
countries (Figure 2b). Large to very large countries are also mostly affluent, populated 
and powerful (Figure 3), a conjunction of factors that make them fundamentally 
responsible for the conservation of nature. As a matter of fact, these countries manage a 
remarkable amount of natural resources and biodiversity, occupy multiple continents or 
hemispheres, possess the material resources to maintain and promote conservation 
programs, and shape and determine their own and others' economic and political actions 
with the greatest independence (Beckley, 2018; Neumann & Gstöhl, 2004). Certainly, 
every country should make a similar attempt to conserve a fraction of their natural 
resources (SCBD, 2010), as the fulfillment of common goals by small countries ensures 
the protection of their geographical or biological singularities. However, this legal 
equality has a political and –essentially– ecological counterpart, since an effective 
growth of the global protected area network depends on larger countries which have the 
actual capacity to generate radical changes at that spatial level. 
More than two decades ago, Wells and Williams (1998) pointed out that, with 
the demise of communism in Russia, the economic resources allocated to conservation 
sharply declined, with a consequent weakening of law enforcement and an increase in 
illegal activities in protected areas. Confirming and extending these findings, Watson, et 
al. (2014) suggested that there was significant evidence that more affluent and extensive 
countries were cutting financial and human resources for the conservation sector, and 
were even overlooking existing conservation policies and legislation. This has occurred 
in spite of the strong discourse in these countries towards increasing the size and 









considering the level of anthropization of protected areas (Jones, et al., 2018; Leroux, et 
al., 2010), the specific efforts in the conservation of a taxon (Lindsey, et al., 2017), or 
even the attitudes of the population. By means of social surveys, Nawrotzki (2012) 
stated that the strongest opposition toward environmental protection was observed in 
conservative people of most powerful, capitalist countries. 
This differential effort emerges so markedly that it is interesting to return to a 
selective and meaningful comparison between extreme cases. If Russia and the United 
States of America sought to repeat the examples of Liechtenstein and São Tomé and 
Príncipe, their protected area networks would need to incorporate millions of square 
kilometers, and their largest protected areas would need to be significantly larger. 
Comparisons can be considered at some point unlikely due to the deep economic and 
social implications that these and other large countries would have to face in light of a 
different territorial order. However, comparisons stress that some small to medium-
sized countries have decided to follow a conservation-prone spatial planning without 
many –at least financial– apparent difficulties. Renowned Bhutan's conservation efforts 
exceed protected areas, as its constitution mandates that at least 60% of the country 
must remain with its natural forest cover (Lham, Wangchuk, Stolton, & Dudley, 2019; 
Wangchuk, 2007).  
Turning back to the Aichi agreements, the debt held by the largest or most 
powerful countries is enlarged by considering the second clause of Target 11 (SCBD, 
2010), which sets that conservation networks have to sample all natural conditions and 
all levels of life organization with the same effort. According to Barr, et al. (2011), the 
very large countries protect in a divergent way: Russia's network equitably encompasses 
most ecoregions of the country, while Brazil, the United States of America, Indonesia, 
India, Mexico, and China networks are biased towards a few ecoregions. To reinforce 
this idea, we deliberately excluded the non-contiguous states of Alaska and Hawaii of 
the United States of America, as well as their external possessions in Figure 1. Protected 
areas are frequently established on territories that face little human interventions and 
have comparatively low opportunity-costs (Baldi, et al., 2019; Baldi, et al., 2017; Joppa 
& Pfaff, 2009). One possibility to overcome these problems of imbalances among and 
within countries is that international representation goals are not established at the 
country level but at the level of ecoregion or physical environments (Aksenov, 









should agree on multilateral strategies of conservation of their natural conditions 
regardless of the protected national extent. 
4.2. Size and power in context 
None of the individual relationships explored in Figure 2 was particularly strong. 
This fact does not detract what was expressed in section 4.1 but rather indicates that 
there are multiple interactions not identified in the analyses. Interactions would explain 
why income inequality has prevailed in the random forest ranking (Figure 4). In fact, 
Kashwan (2017) found a strong interplay between income inequality and the system of 
government: When democracy prevailed, inequality led to less protection, whereas 
when totalitarianism did, inequality led to more protection. 
Including income inequality and other variables in these analyses was aimed at 
contextualizing the importance of size and power drivers. From these, the one that 
reached the greatest importance turned out to be military expenditure (second position), 
followed by population size, GDP, land area and external possessions in decreasing 
order (Figure 4). Regardless of the position in the ranking, the question about which 
mechanisms explain the effect of size and power remain unanswered. Having stated 
this, the empirical knowledge generated in this and previous studies (see Table 3) 
provides evidence to propose the following a posteriori hypotheses: 
(#1) The per capita costs of public goods and services are determined by the 
number of taxpayers (Alesina, 2003; Spolaore, 2004). In this regard, the larger and more 
powerful the country is (in population terms), the more economically viable it would be 
to maintain and expand a network of protected areas. 
(#2) The integration to world society is commonly related to economic wealth in 
the smallest or less powerful countries (Pelling & Uitto, 2001; Prasad, 2009). In this 
regard, and as opposed to the previous hypothesis, conservation would be internally 
boosted by accomplishing multilateral or international treaties, regulations, or 
agreements (like the CBD, Woodley, et al., 2012), or by attending transnational social 
movements (T. Lewis, 2000). In addition to this integration, conservation projects in 
smaller countries frequently obtain financial assistance from international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) (Frank, et al., 2000; Kashwan, 2017). This can 








2012) or a sign of soft power (i.e., the ability to attract and co-opt others) that larger 
countries exert over smaller ones (Arvanitidis & Kollias, 2016; Beckley, 2018). 
(#3) The diversity and abundance of natural resources are generally determined 
by the land area of a country through a sampling effect (except those occupying extreme 
deserts) (Freudenberger, Hobson, Schluck, & Ibisch, 2012). In this regard, the larger the 
country is (in terms of land area), the greater the redundancy of diverse resources will 
be. Given this redundancy, larger countries would allocate a small fraction of their 
territories to conservation to achieve representation goals. Complementarily, smaller 
countries would allocate a large fraction of their territories to maintain their natural 
system, ensuring the provision of varied resources or services and the achievement of 
representation goals. 
(#4) Given the interaction between the aspects associated with an economy of 
scale (hypothesis #1) and a limited diversity of resources (hypothesis #3), the economic 
viability of the smallest and less powerful countries (in terms of land area, population, 
GDP) would be conditioned by non-extractive or unconventional industries, such as 
tourism in tropical islands (Croes, 2013). In this regard, the smallest and less powerful 
is the country, the tourism industry would be boosted by the maintenance of landscape 
quality and biological diversity in protected areas. 
Considering the results depicted in Figures 1 and 2a-f, the mechanism that 
supports the first hypotheses would not prevail, since even countries with a very low 
population maintain extensive protected area systems (e.g., Iceland, Mongolia, 
Namibia) (Figure 2d,j). The other three hypotheses could advocate mechanisms that 
have effective implications for conservation, although these have received mixed 
support from our results. As an example, we found that the highly correlated 
governance-globalization drivers (Figure 3), which achieved an intermediate to low 
position in the importance ranking (Figure 4), showed an inconclusive relationship with 
the protected extent (Figure 2k,l). This questions the interactions or mediations of 
hypothesis #2 and the findings of Frank, et al. (2000) and Baynham-Herd, et al. (2018), 
who emphasized the positive role of cultural processes that promote the links to world 
society (i.e., globalization) directing conservation efforts. 
Other less explored factors, such as the closeness to natural environments, the 









scarcity or finitude of natural resources in resource-constrained environments, could 
support the thesis of a greater conservation effort in smaller or less powerful countries 
(Aguilera-Klink, Pérez-Moriana, & Sánchez-Garcıá, 2000; McNeely, 2015). Oceanic 
islands could be used to test these ideas, as they frequently maintain well-organized 
strategies of land management due to their high environmental, demographic, and 
economic vulnerabilities (Christensen & Mertz, 2010; Pelling & Uitto, 2001). 
Our results could be used to unfold conservation scenarios in the face of 
geopolitical changes, specifically in relation to the number and size of countries. Two 
opposite phenomena occur in this regard. On the one hand, new countries will probably 
emerge as there are still subnational regions and stateless nations asserting for full 
sovereignty and recognition (e.g., New Caledonia, Kurdistan) (Baldacchino & Hepburn, 
2012; Veenendaal & Corbett, 2014). On the other hand, the pursuit of sovereignty has 
sharply declined in the last decades (e.g., Basque Country, Scotland) (Baldacchino & 
Hepburn, 2012; Baldacchino & Milne, 2006), some once sovereign and recognized 
countries have been (re)united (e.g., Germany, Yemen) and political blocks have been 
formed with different levels of supranational unification (e.g., Turkic Council, European 
Union). If small territories gained sovereignty, we wonder whether the creation of 
protected areas would slow down (hypothesis #1) or accelerate (hypotheses #2 to #4). 
And vice versa, if unions consolidate, it would be interesting to question whether the 
creation of protected areas would accelerate (hypothesis #1) or slow down (hypotheses 
#2 to #4).  
Finally, we highlight some caveats of the paper. First, the land area could be 
intuitively considered a geographical –more than a cultural– trait. However, as stated by 
Alesina (2003), the land area would not be necessarily a factor external to a country's 
culture, as the same culture could determine this merely geographical feature. Second, 
we have exclusively evaluated the relationships of each cultural driver and the current 
protected extent. Yet, in the historical process of growth of protected area networks, 
these relationships have varied (McDonald & Boucher, 2011; Radeloff, et al., 2013). 
Third, the described relationships came from the comparison between countries, but 
these relationships can have different shapes or intensities at other spatial levels. For 
example, the populational or scenic characteristics of a territory –traits of low 
explanatory power according to our approach– have been identified as drivers of the 









Joppa & Pfaff, 2009). Fourth, we did not evaluate the effectiveness of the protection 
networks in terms of their ability to limit interventions such as infrastructure 
development or resource extraction, an aspect that can distinguish countries with 
different cultural and institutional qualities (Abman, 2018). At last, the role of 
unconsidered IUCN conservation categories could modify the messages from this study. 
Nevertheless, we left aside these categories (and other such as wilderness areas, Dietz, 
Belote, Aplet, & Aycrigg, 2015) as their governance and tenure potentially lack formal 
protection and management, they have uncertain conservation objectives and long-term 
capabilities, and their enforcement of law is compromised (Shafer, 2015, 2019).  
5. Conclusions 
The commitment of countries to nature conservation, specifically through the 
deployment of protected areas, showed to be greatly uneven among countries, from 
those which completely devoid of this legal figure to those in which nearly half of the 
territory is strictly protected. These differences would obey to the interaction of several 
underlying and direct cultural drivers. Previous studies that observe these relationships 
excluded countries of small size, sparsely populated, recently conformed or of insular 
character, omitting thus extreme and deviant geographical or cultural cases. Meanwhile, 
until now the size and power of a country as a driver of the protected extent of a country 
had not been explored. We intended to amend both situations, finding that the largest or 
most powerful countries have made a lower conservation effort than the smaller or less 
powerful ones. Size and power would mediate individual or joint effects of other drivers 
or would act directly as a mechanism by allowing, for example, stronger countries to 
impose policies over weaker countries or by abstaining to participate (the stronger) 
countries in international agreements. 
Regardless of these points, the largest and most powerful countries are the ones 
that have the greatest responsibility in nature protection, given that internal changes in 
their conservation policies aimed at increasing the extension and financing their 
protected areas imply the success of the global conservation of nature. Perhaps a more 
plausible conclusion about the differences among countries is that the larger and more 
powerful ones protect less, not because they cannot do better, but because it is not part 
of their political agendas. Paraphrasing Lewis and Wigen (1997), an increasingly 









of the distribution of protected areas to understand the needs, debts, and opportunities in 
the conservation of nature. 
Declaration of interests 
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal 
relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper. 
 
Acknowledgments 
I would like to thank S.A. Schauman, S. Aguiar, J.I. Whitworth-Hulse, O.A. Martín, T. 
Milani, E.G. Jobbágy, M. Grainger, and the anonymous reviewers for their ideas and 
collaboration in different stages of the study. We would also like to thank D. 
McGreevey and the Gabinete de Asesoramiento en Escritura Científica en Inglés, 
UNSL, for her service and help. 
References 
Abman, R. (2018). Rule of Law and Avoided Deforestation from Protected Areas. Ecological 
Economics, 146, 282-289. 
Aguilera-Klink, F., Pérez-Moriana, E., & Sánchez-Garcıá, J. (2000). The social construction of 
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Figure 1. Protected areas categorized as I-IV under the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature guidelines (IUCN, 1994) in eight countries with contrasting 
geographies and human contexts. Alaska and Hawaii in the United States of America 











Figure 2. Extent and LOESS models of the networks of protected areas along socio-
economical, conservation and geographical gradients. Panels (a) to (f) are related to the 
size and power of countries. In violin plots (a, f, o and p panels), horizontal lines 
represent the 0.5 quantiles. The number of samples is depicted on each panel. The eight 
countries of Figure 1 are labeled with the following acronyms: Argentina (AR), Bhutan 
(BT), Liechtenstein (LI), Malta (MT), Russia (RU), São Tomé and Príncipe (ST), 
Trinidad and Tobago (TT) and United States of America (US). Blue points represent the 











Figure 3. Kendall’s τ correlation coefficients between continuous variables (n = 194). 












Figure 4. Relative importance of fourteen variables related to socio-economical, 
conservation and geographical contexts according to the random forest (RF). The 
variable importance is depicted by the increase in the mean square error when the out-
of-bag data for a variable is permuted while all others are left unchanged. Variables #1 











Figure 5. Relationship between the largest protected area of the country and its land 
area. The four lineal models represent isolines of this relationship (e.g., the 10% isoline 
represents a single protected area that occupies a tenth of the land area). Different colors 
represent the size classes of Crowards (2002a, 2002b) which consider, besides land 












Table 1. Inequality in the distribution of variables related to the size and power of a 
country, following Crowards (2002a, 2002b) and Arvanitidis and Kollias (2016). 
Variable Minimum Median Maximum Inequality 
(Gini index) 
Land area (k km
2
) 0.01 x 10-3 566 16,953 0.80 
Gross domestic 
product (M US 
Dollars) 
10 2.7 x 104 1.6 x 107 0.87 
Population size (M 
inh) 
8 x 10-4 7.2 1,338 0.81 
Military 
expenditure (M US 
Dollars) 










Table 2. List of independent variables associated with the extent of the protected area by 
country. Variables #1 to #6 are related to the two intertwined concepts of size and 
power following Crowards (2002b) and Arvanitidis and Kollias (2016). Variables #7 to 
#16 are used to contextualize size and power results. 
# Variable Units Description 
1 Crowards' 
country size 
categorical Crowards (2002a, 2002b) classification of 179 independent 
countries into five categories, according to their area, GDP and 
population. The categorization of unclassified countries (e.g., 
Australia, Canada) were completed following his classification 
scheme 






US Dollars  Economic size or development of a country and, therefore, 




inh Stock of human capital and size of the domestic market. From 
Natural Earth (2017) 
5 Military 
expenditure 
US Dollars Capability to dissuade and/or coerce external entities/policies to 
either protect and/or advance national interests at national to 
global levels. Average values 2007-2016. From the World Bank 
(2018). Missing cases (e.g., Comoros), from the 
GlobalSecurity.org (2011). Other measures of military power 
has been proposed (Beckley, 2018; Singer, 1988), but due to 




categorical Similar to #5, but enabling countries to influence policies 
abroad. Included countries (†) posses overseas military bases or 
govern overseas territories, territories with ethnic minorities and 
listed as "Non Self Governing Territories" according to the 2018 
Session of the United Nations (e.g., American Samoa), "Special 
member state territories" of the European Union (e.g., Canary 
Is.) or other categories (e.g., Easter Is.) 








unitless Estimate of inequality in equivalized (square root scale) 
household disposable income (post-tax, post-transfer) from Solt 
(2016). Average Gini index 2007-2016. For Andorra, The 
Bahamas, Cuba, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore, 
from the IMUNA country profiles (2018) 
9 Education unitless From the Human Development Index ranks. Calculated using 
mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling. 
Average values 2005-2015 (UNDP, 2015) 
10 Population 
density 
inh * km-2 Pressure of population per area for natural resources and space. 
From Natural Earth (2017) 
11 Globalization unitless Economic, social and political globalization, which includes 
data on economic flows and restrictions, information flow, and 
cultural proximity. From the KOF Swiss Economic Institute 
average values 2006-2015, overall values (Gygli, Haelg, & 
Sturm, 2018) 
12 Governance unitless Considering voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory 







Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010). From the World Bank (2018) 





% Relative importance of this economic activity, given that nature 
protection attracts visitors interested in remarkable natural or 
cultural landscapes, and tourism drive protection to preserve this 
quality. From the WTTC (2017) data base. 2017 values. 
14 Age of the 
PA network 
y Number of years since the creation of the first protected area. 
From UNEP-WCMC, et al. (2018) 
15 Continental 
or insular 
categorical If the country is mostly continental or insular (e.g., Malaysia is 
considered an insular country, as 60% of its territory is in 
Borneo Is.) 
16 Continent categorical Following the six fold model (Lewis & Wigen, 1997)‡ 
† Australia, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Israel, Morocco, Norway, New 
Zealand, Portugal, Russia, Spain, The Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America. 











Table 3. Non-exhaustive list of global studies about the cultural drivers of protected 
areas extent at a national level. Physical variables were excluded from the field of 
drivers (e.g., terrain slope). Acronyms: GDP Gross Domestic Product, GNI Gross 
National Income, IGOs intergovernmental organizations, INGOs international 
nongovernmental organizations, IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature, 
PA protected areas, sd standard deviation, Spp. species, UN United Nations.  
Reference Focus problem IUCN 
categories 


















ecological and natural 
science organizations, 
iron and steel 
production per capita, 
population size‡ 
Unknown number, 
but excluding those 
of small land are (< 










living on US Dollars 1 
per day, World Bank 
income†, GNI per 
capita 
136, excluding those 
of low population (< 













GDP per capita, 
population density, 
urbanization, 
agricultural land, spp. 
richness, IUCN Red 
List spp. 
160, excluding those 












per capita, population 
density, life 
expectancy, forest 
area, spp. richness,  
Variable number 












age, GDP‡, GDP per 
Unknown number, 
but excluding those 











† categorical variables. 
‡ size variables. 
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